Iraq and
Afghanistan Supplemental Spending 2008:
By Jeff
Leys
Voices for Creative
Nonviolence
May 8, 2007
Don’t lose the forest for the trees.
Congress is now considering President Bush’s request for an
additional $145 billion to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through
September 30, 2008. The House Armed
Services Committee is including these funds in the Defense Authorization Bill
for Fiscal Year 2008, which runs from October 1, 2007 to September 30,
2008. Of this, $142 billion will be for
the military and $3 billion will be for the State Department.
President Bush submitted this request on February 5, the
same date on which he requested $93 billion for the wars for this year’s budget
and $482 billion for the regular baseline military budget for FY 2008 (a 62%
increase over the baseline military budget in 2001).
While political gamesmanship will continue over war funding
for this fiscal year (which ends on September 30), the substantive debate on
this year’s supplemental bill is all but over.
Congress will most likely approve these funds, including “benchmark”
requirements placed upon Iraq’s government.
These “benchmarks” are meaningless in terms of ending U.S. military
action in Iraq. Most likely, not even a
“goal” date for withdrawal from Iraq will be included in the final supplemental
bill for this year.
The antiwar movement must quickly shift its focus to the
$145 billion supplemental spending request for FY 08. If the focus doesn’t shift, the war will end up being fully
funded through September 30, 2008 and beyond.
But then: What is to be done?
Congress could, if it so chooses—and if there is sufficient
public pressure--exercise “the power of the purse” and bring the Iraq war to an
end. The time to act is short.
As noted, the 2008 war funds are already included in the
Defense Authorization bill currently before Congress. Authorization bills set spending levels for the next fiscal year
and guide the development of the appropriations bills. Once the Authorization bill is passed, the
next stop is the Appropriations Committee, which crafts the legislation that
actually appropriates the funds for expenditure.
In the last two years, Congress included Iraq and
Afghanistan war funding in the same Defense Appropriations bill that contained
funds for the baseline military budget.
In 2005, Congress approved $50 billion as a “reserve” fund while in 2006
it approved $70 billion as a “bridge” fund.
If Congress chooses to include the $142 billion supplemental war request
and the regular baseline military budget in the same appropriations bill this
year, the most likely time for Congress to act will be in June (in the House)
and in July (in the Senate). Most
likely, a final conference committee bill will be acted upon in September
(Democrats most likely will want to position themselves as the party of “fiscal
responsibility” by passing all appropriations before October 1, the start of
the fiscal year).
Congress must use the leverage it has with the Defense
Authorization and the Defense Appropriations bills to force an end to the Iraq
war. Congress could attach provisions
to the Defense Authorization bill and to the Defense Appropriations Bill requiring
that all U.S. troops be withdrawn from Iraq by a specific date during FY 08 and
prohibiting the expenditure of any
funds for any form of continued military action in or against Iraq after that
date. This “date certain” withdrawal
could be December 31, 2007 (as proposed in legislation introduced by
Representatives Waters, Woolsey and Lee).
Or it could be March 31, 2008—implementing the policy objective put
forth by Congress in the initial supplemental spending bill that President Bush
vetoed. The only funds appropriated
should be for the safe and orderly withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from
Iraq. Congress must then hold fast in
February 2008, when Bush would most certainly seek additional war funds with
yet another supplemental spending package.
If the above scenario is pursued, would Bush veto the entire
military budget for Fiscal Year 2008?
If he does, would Congress show political and ethical resolve, holding
firm and resubmitting the baseline military budget and supplemental war budget in
the same bill and with the same deadlines for a date-certain withdrawal from
Iraq?
Our responsibility is to press the demand for the immediate
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq (and, indeed, the complete cessation of all
military action against Iraq—e.g., after ground troops are withdrawn we cannot
allow an air war to continue).
But it’s also our responsibility to engage the legislative
process with concrete demands that have a basis in the reality of power
politics in Washington, D.C. Simply
saying “withdraw now”, without any substantive legislative or political
strategy, moves us to the land of the irrelevant—and, sadly, accepting a
position of irrelevance ends up reinforcing the broad and lamentable complicity
that we as U.S. citizens collectively bear for the blood-spilling in Iraq.
We must also have a solid grounding in the complexities of
the supplemental war spending request for FY 2008. In particular, we should be prepared to refute the argument that
a cut-off of funding will, “ipso facto”, further endanger troops currently
deployed in Iraq. It is not necessary
to be able to cross every “t” and dot every “i”, but the response should be
grounded in an understanding of the war budget.
What follows is an effort to break down and analyze the
various components of the military’s request for $142 billion in supplemental
spending for FY 08. This analysis will
focus upon the Army’s request for funding the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Arguments similar to those detailed in the
analysis of the Army’s spending request apply to the spending requests
submitted by the Air Force and the Navy and Marine Corps. This analysis is based upon the voluminous
materials that the various Armed Services submitted in February 2007 to justify
and detail their budgetary requests.
This material is available on the website of the Comptroller of the
Department of Defense (www.defenselink.mil/comptroller). The data includes funding for both the Iraq
and Afghanistan wars. The military
services do not provide a break out by specific war.
AVERAGE TROOP STRENGTH IN FY 2008
The Fiscal Year 08 supplemental spending bill provides for
full funding for current levels of troop strength through September 30,
2008. The slightly smaller number in FY
08 is likely due to a gradual end of the troop “surge” that was initiated this
year.
Average Troop Strengths
Army FY
07 FY 08
Active Duty 123,000 119,000
Army Reserve 9,000 9,000
Army National Guard 24,000 24,000
Total 156,000 149,000
[FN-1]
Marine FY
07 FY 08
Active Duty
23,280 23, 280
Reserve 3,214 3,214
Total
26,494 26,494
[FN-2]
Subsistence-in-Kind is a key indicator of the level of
anticipated troop deployments during FY 08.
The Army is budgeting for an average troop level of 159,580 troops in FY
08 compared to 170,771 in FY 07 (and 119,277 in FY 06). [FN-3]
Subsistence-in-Kind (SIK) is the provision of “…(food and
drink) to Soldiers while deployed in support of both OEF and OIF. SIK includes the cost of procuring
subsistence for garrison dining facilities (Subsistence in Messes), operational
rations, and augmentation rations. The
Army provides subsistence in mess facilities and operational rations for
members of all military services participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). [FN-4]
The anticipated average number of Army units deployed to
Iraq and Afghanistan is the final indicator that the U.S. plans to fully fund
the wars through all of FY 08. The Army
plans to maintain an average of 14 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) in Iraq in FY 08,
the same as in FY 06. It does reflect a
draw down from the average of 18 BCT’s in FY 07, but that is simply because the
troop surge of this year may wind down next year. The Army plans to maintain the same level of Combat Support
Brigades and Combat Service Brigades in Iraq as in FY 06 and in FY 07. [FN-5].
Clearly the Department of Defense is not anticipating any
significant reduction in military operations in Iraq any time soon. The Army’s justification material submitted
in February 2007 for the Operation and Maintenance segment of its budget
consistently uses the phrase: “The FY 2008 estimate assumes a level of effort
consistent with the tempo of FY 2007 operations.” [FN-6]
Operation & Maintenance – Army
Operation & Maintenance is by far the largest budget
category. The Army seeks $46.2 billion
for FY 08—or 33% of the total military request for FY 08. This category includes such subcategories
as: equipment maintenance; body armor and other protective gear; the Logistical
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP); and OPTEMPO.
Equipment Maintenance – Army
“The troops in Iraq will be left without necessary supplies,
equipment and weapons” is a common argument advanced to justify continued
funding of the war in Iraq.
This argument can be refuted through an analysis of the
Army’s justification materials for war funding. The following analysis focuses solely on the question about
whether denying specific forms of
funding might have a negative impact on troops currently deployed in Iraq. This analysis assumes that a cut off of
funding would be tied to a safe and orderly withdrawal of these troops.
Theater Maintenance and Reset are the two broad categories
of equipment maintenance. Theater
Maintenance occurs in Southwest Asia: at forward repair bases in Iraq; or at
repair facilities in Kuwait or Qatar.
Reset occurs after a unit has redeployed to its home base from
Iraq.
The Army is seeking to shift more repair work to Theater
Maintenance, increasing its budget in this area to $2.3 billion in FY 08
(compared to $1.2 billion in FY 07). [FN-7]
Unfortunately, the Army does not further break down how this $2.3
billion will be spent for each subcategory of Theater Maintenance. The subcategories include maintenance of
Armored Security Vehicles and Stryker vehicles, explaining that the Stryker
program “…provides for the support of the deployed and next deploying
SBCT….Funding also supports SLAT armor (protection against Rocket Propelled
Grenade attacks) removal / reconstitution (spare parts in-theater) and sustainment
package for Ranger Stryker vehicles.”
[FN-8] SBCT stands for “Stryker
Brigade Combat Team”.
“Left Behind Equipment” is another subcategory within
Theater Maintenance. The Army explains
that “Upon deployment, units are required to leave behind certain items of
equipment and draw from the Theater Provided Equipment (TPE). The equipment left behind in CONUS must be
repaired in preparation for reissue.
Due to the severe shortages of equipment in CONUS, a large majority of
the equipment is redistributed to support next deploying units, activations and
shortages within units undergoing Reset.” [FN-9]
This means that a unit deployed to Iraq leaves some of its
equipment behind in the U.S. CONUS is
short for the command for Continental United States. These deploying units then are issued equipment once they arrive
in Iraq or Afghanistan (or at a staging area in Kuwait prior to entering Iraq).
It is clear that some unspecified portion of the $2.3
billion sought for Theater Maintenance is for troops currently deployed in
either Iraq or Afghanistan. However, it
is also clear that some unspecified portion is to repair equipment in-theater
for use by troops in the process of being deployed to Iraq. It cannot plausibly be argued that cutting
funds for the portion dedicated to repairing equipment for use by units in the
process of being deployed to Iraq would in any way harm the troops currently
deployed in Iraq (if, indeed, the goal is to withdraw from Iraq).
Reset of Equipment
Reset is the other broad category of equipment maintenance
and repair. Reset is the process of
restoring a piece of equipment to full functionality. Reset takes place after a unit is redeployed to its home base
outside of Iraq. The Army states that
the higher demands placed upon equipment used in Iraq “…increase maintenance
requirements for equipment employed in the theater and do not immediately
curtail when units and equipment redeploy to home station. Maintenance and supply / resupply actions
following redeployment restore the depth to our force…” [FN-10]
The Army seeks $7.8 billion for Reset for FY 08. That is 17% of the $46.2 billion sought by
the Army in the supplemental for Operation and Maintenance. Since Reset is to prepare equipment for use
by units that deploy back to Iraq—rather than units currently deployed in
Iraq—eliminating Reset funds will not harm troops currently deployed in
Iraq. It does not result in denying any
troops currently deployed in Iraq any form of equipment necessary in Iraq.
Body Armor and Other Protective Gear – Army
The Army seeks $2.9 billion for “Clothing and Personal
Equipment”. Of this amount, $1.1
billion is for Individual Body Armor; $1.3 billion for Other Force Protection;
and $0.5 billion for the Rapid Fielding Initiative, which “…provides deployers
and next deployers with enhanced individual clothing and equipment for
increased force protection, mobility, survivability and lethality.” [FN-11]
The Individual Body Armor includes funds for the purchase of
150,000 sets of Next Generation Ballistic Plates, Side Plates and Outer
Tactical Vests as well as 150,000 Improved Advanced Combat Helmets. [FN-12]
It can indeed be plausibly argued that the expenditure of
these funds directly benefits troops deployed in Iraq. At the same time, these expenditures could
be reduced if the U.S. begins the withdrawal of troops from Iraq with complete
withdrawal from Iraq completed by either December 31, 2007 or March 31, 2008.
OPTEMPO and LOGCAP – Army
The Army is seeking $9.8 billion for OPTEMPO, the pace and
tempo of operations. No further
breakout of this amount is provided in the Army’s justification materials. The Army states, “The estimated average
annual deployed force will consist of approximately 150,000 Soldiers conducting
continuous operations in harsh conditions…Heavy units equipped with tanks and
infantry fighting vehicles consume large amounts of resources (e.g., fuel,
parts and supplies) during these types of operations…” [FN-13]
The Army seeks $6 billion for the Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in FY 08 compared to $5.1 billion in FY 07. LOGCAP is the civilian contract support
which provides basic services to the military forces in theater. It is the contract made famous by Haliburton
a few years back. LOGCAP includes such
items as “…food services, power generation, electrical distribution, facilities
management, dining facility operations, pest management…” and other services.
[FN-14]
It can be plausibly argued that a reduction in the funds for
OPTEMPO and for LOGCAP would have a negative impact upon troops deployed to
Iraq. At the same time, it can be
plausibly argued that the amount allocated for OPTEMPO could be reduced by
withdrawing U.S. troops to their bases in Iraq as a prelude to withdrawal and
then completing the withdrawal from Iraq.
Similarly, the LOGCAP funding amount would be reduced by the draw down
and complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq.
Procurement of Vehicles, Weapons and Ammunition
“If the supplemental budget isn’t passed, troops in Iraq
will be without vehicles with upgraded armor to protect against IED’s; without
ammunition; without combat vehicles”, or so the argument goes. Yet this argument is without merit—unless
the U.S. fully intends to keep troops in Iraq for at least the next 18 to 36
months.
The procurement process spans three years. Simply because money is appropriated in the
budget for a specific fiscal year does not mean that the money will be spent
that year nor does it mean that the item being procured will be produced that
fiscal year. Congress appropriates
money in a fiscal year and grants authority to the Defense Department to enter
into contracts for particular items.
The Pentagon enters into contracts, obligating the funds to be paid to
the company that produces the item. The
company produces the item and delivers it to the Defense Department. All this takes place over a period of up to
three years following the appropriation of funds.
To address this lag time in the normal procurement process,
the Army established the “Rapid Equipping Force” and the “Rapid Fielding
Initiative”. The funds for these
programs are included in the Operation and Maintenance portion of the budget
and were discussed in the section on “Individual Body Armor and Other
Protective Gear” above.
The Army seeks $21.1 billion for Procurement in the FY 08
supplemental spending request. The
total military request is for $36 billion in procurement funds. I’ll focus on just a handful of items to
illustrate the procurement process and to refute the argument that failure to
fund the procurement of these items will further endanger troops in Iraq by
leaving them without vehicles, equipment or weapons—unless, of course, the U.S.
intends to continue to wage the war in Iraq for up to 3 years into the future.
It should be noted that the following discussion applies to
the military’s request for supplemental funding for procurement in Fiscal Year
2008. The Army is also seeking funding
for many of the following items within its regular baseline military budget
request.
HMMWV – High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
The Army is seeking $1.3 billion in supplemental spending in
FY 08 to procure 6690 HMMWV’s, “…a lightweight, high performance…family of
tactical vehicles…” (known in the popular lexicon as Humvees). Those purchased will have “…integrated armor
and safety initiatives such as fire suppression and safety restraints…”
[FN-15].
The first HMMWV procured with FY 08 supplemental funds will
be delivered to the Army in January 2009.
The last one will be delivered in December 2009. [FN –16].
Armored Security Vehicle - ASV
The Army seeks $302 million in supplemental funding in FY 08
to “…procure 371 ASV. The ASV is used
by the Military Police (MP) to perform missions of Area Security, maneuver and
Mobility Support, Police Intelligence Operations, and Law and Order
Operations….ASV is also used by MPs to conduct Force Protection and
Stabilization Operations in a war environment.
Additionally, ASV is increasingly being used as a Convoy Protection Platform
for Combat Support and Combat Services Support Units.” [FN-17]
The first Armored Security Vehicle funded by the FY 08
supplemental is scheduled to be delivered in June 2009. The last will be delivered in April
2010. [FN-18]
Modification of In-Service Equipment
The Army seeks $1.1 billion in supplemental funding for
various modifications to various pieces of in-service equipment. Modifications include: “Fragmentation (FRAG)
Kit #3 provides armored protection around the HMMWV fuel tank. FRAG Kit #4 provides armored panel
protection to the vehicle underbody for HMWWV and M915A2.” [FN-19]
The FRAG Kit #3 “…design is 95% complete…” as of the
February 2007 Army justification materials.
The first output of this kit is scheduled for the first quarter of FY
2009 (which is October – December 08) with the last output of kits set for the
fourth quarter of FY 09 (which is July – September 09). [FN-20]
FRAG Kit #4--armor for the underbelly of the HMMWV--further
illustrates the reality that funds appropriated for procurement will not end up
providing equipment to troops currently deployed in Iraq. The Army notes in its justification material
that two prior designs failed in the design and testing phases and states that
“Currently, theater, ARL, ATEC and TARDEC are trying a 3rd
generation design to another set of requirements. Currently, this effort is in the early design phase and any
successful Proof of Principle testing will require a MINIMUM of 180 days to
develop and successfully integrate onto the M1114 UAH and M1151 Family.”
The installation schedule provides for the first output of
FRAG Kit #4 to occur in the second quarter of FY 09 (January – March 2010) with
the final output scheduled in the first quarter of FY 10 (Oct to December
2010). [FN-21]
Bradley Base Sustainment
The Army seeks $1.4 billion to procure 481 recapitalized
(upgraded) Bradley vehicles. The “…A3
conversion improves on the Operation Desert Storm (ODS) variant through the
addition of two 2nd Generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
devices, upgraded core electronics, improved ballistic fire control systems,
enhanced command and control, situational awareness, and a collective Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection system.” [FN-22]
The contract is scheduled to be awarded in November 2007,
with the date of first delivery to be in March 2009. The last vehicles are set to be delivered in February 2010. [FN-23]
Stryker Vehicle Modifications
The Army seeks $0.5 billion in supplemental funding to
procure “…additional Survivability Enhancements for Stryker Vehicles (both 1
inch Slat armor and Stryker Reactive Armor Tiles (SRAT))…” [FN-24]
The contract is scheduled to be awarded in July 2008, with
the first delivery of the Stryker vehicle set for August 2009. Vehicles will be produced through July
2010. [FN-25].
Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles
The Army seeks $48 million to procure 148 sets of Bradley
Reactive Armor Tiles. [FN-26]. “The tiles provide increased armor
protection and crew survivability against shaped charge threats…” [FN-27].
The contract is scheduled to be awarded in June 2008 with
the first set of 84 tiles to be delivered in June 2009 and the second set of 64
tiles to be delivered in the fourth quarter of FY 09 (July – September 2009).
[FN-28]
Abrams Upgrade
The Army seeks $1.3 billion in supplemental funding to
upgrade 235 M1/M1A1 tanks to the M1A2 System Enhancement Program configuration
which “…has improved frontal and side armor for enhance crew
survivability.” [FN-29]
The first upgraded vehicle is to be delivered in January
2009 with the last being delivered in December 2009. [FN-30]
Ammunition
One might think that ammunition would be very readily and
quickly produced and delivered after Congress has appropriated funds to procure
ammunition. You’d be wrong. The earliest that any ammunition procured
with the supplemental spending package would be delivered is May 2008, with
delivery continued through May 2009.
That’s for a single item—the CTG 12 Gauge Breaching Round “…used to gain
access through high doors and entryways.”
[FN-31]
Otherwise, the earliest expected date for delivery of a
procured ammunition item would be in October of 2008. Most items would not begin to be delivered to the Army until
January 2009 (or later), with delivery continuing into 2010. [FN-32]
ENDNOTES
1) p. 4. “Operation
and Maintenance, Army: Justification Book, Volume I”, Department of the Army,
Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Supplemental Budget Estimates, February 2007.
2) Department of the
Navy. FY 2008 GWOT Request. Operation
and Maintenance, Marine Corps. O-1 Line Item Summary, in Department of the
Navy. Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/2009 Budget
Estimates. Justification of
Estimates. FY 2008 Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT) Request, February 2007.
3) p. 31. Army Military Personnel. Department of Defense. FY 2008 Supplemental Request for Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). February 2007.
4) Ibid, p. 4.
5) op. cit.,
“Operation and Maintenance, Army”, p. 4
6) See for example,
Ibid, p. 7, 8, 10, 11.
7) Ibid. p. 16
8) Ibid, p. 17
9) Ibid, p. 17
10) Ibid, p. 22
11) Ibid, p. 8 and 9
12) Ibid, p. 8
13) Ibid, p. 13
14) Ibid, p. 13
15) p. 19. “Other Procurement, Army: Tactical and
Support Vehicles, Budget Activity 1”, Department of the Army, Procurement
Programs, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2008 Global War on Terror
Budget Estimate. February 2007.
16) Ibid, p. 22
17) Ibid, p. 59
18) Ibid, p. 62 and
63
19) Ibid, p. 91
20) Ibid, p. 97
21) Ibid, p. 125
22) p. 3. Department of the Army; Procurement
Programs; Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book; FY 2008 Global War on Terror
Budget Estimate; Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army. February 2007.
23) Ibid., p. 5, 6,
7
24) Ibid, p. 9
25) Ibid, p. 13, 14,
and 15
26) Ibid, p. 25
27) Ibid, p. 27.
28) Ibid, p. 27
29) Ibid, p. 58
30) Ibid, p. 62
31) p. 40 and
42. Department of the Army: Procurement
Programs; Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book; FY 2008 Global War On Terror
Budget Estimate; Procurement of Ammunition, Army. February 2007.
32) Ibid.